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PRIOR APPROPRIATIONS WATER RIGHTS: DOES
LUCAS PROVIDE A TAKINGS ACTION AGAINST
FEDERAL REGULATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT?
Twenty years ago, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act' as part
of a series of ecologically-focused legislative acts.2 The Endangered
Species Act (ESA) codifies the federal policy of protecting endangered and
threatened species by designating and maintaining critical habitats.3 While
this policy may be the most effective way to manage the species conserva-
tion effort, it may potentially conflict with private property rights.4
Applying the ESA to state-derived private property rights, such as
appropriations water rights, showcases a potential conflict between these
state rights and federal regulation.5
In its history, the ESA has never been applied to include private property
within a protected species' critical habitat. However, nothing in the
statutory language suggests that the statute is limited to federal property.
Moreover, it would be ironic if endangered and threatened species continue
to be found only on federal property or in federally-regulated waterways.
Therefore, the resulting analysis is premised on a hypothetical situation: the
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
2. Congress passed numerous environmental legislative acts during the 1970s. See, e.g., National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4344 (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401
(1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922i (1988).
3. A. Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western State Water Rights, 20 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 1, 2 (1985). Professor Tarlock focuses on the way the ESA affects state water resource
management programs.
4. Id. at 1. For a discussion of the relationship between property rights and the ESA, see David
P. Berschauer, Is the "Endangered Species Act" Endangered?, 21 Sw. U. L. REv. 991 (1992)
(discussing whether the economic impact of listing rather "innocuous" species as endangered has rallied
support against the ESA); Holmes Rolston, Il, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 283 (1990) (analyzing the ESA's protection of endangered plants and its relationship to
property rights); Rufus C. Young, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: Impacts and Land Use, 629 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 631 (1991) (noting the impact on land use of the newest endangered species to be listed in
Western states).
5. See Tarlock, supra note 3; Melissa K. Estes, Comment, The Effect of the Federal ESA on State
Water Rights, 22 ENvTL. L. 1027 (1992). This Note focuses on whether ESA regulation of a private
water appropriator is subject to a takings action. For a discussion of the impact of the ESA on state
water resource management and hydroelectric power, see Tarlock, supra note 3; Estes, supra.
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federal regulation of a prior appropriator's right to use water, under the
ESA.
Under the theory of prior appropriations, one who possesses a prior
appropriations water right may appropriate a certain quantity of water from
a designated source.6 If the federal government determines that a prior
appropriator's water source lies within an endangered species' critical
habitat, a decision to regulate the critical habitat could deprive the
appropriator of the economic benefit of the appropriations right.7
Consequently, it could be argued that regulation under the ESA could
constitute a taking under the framework articulated by the Supreme Court
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.8
Since its enactment, the ESA has had dramatic economic and political
implications.9 The federal government's designation of critical habitats has
cost taxpayers and private citizens millions of dollars.' Politicians are
forced to make difficult value judgments when faced with the choice of
supporting economic development or protecting a bird or fish from
extinction." Congress will undoubtedly focus on these issues when it
votes on reauthorization of the ESA. 2
6. See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that a taking exists once
a regulation "goes too far" by denying economic benefit).
8. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (D. Wash. 1988). During the 1992
Presidential campaign, George Bush frequently referred to the spotted owl controversy in the Pacific
Northwest. This controversy arose when the spotted owl was listed as an endangered species, thereby
prohibiting any lumbering activity in the areas known to be the owl's habitat. See also Mark Bonnett
& Kurt Zimmerman, Comment, Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the
Northern Spotted Owl, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 105 (1991).
The most recent controversy involves the listing of various salmon species in the Pacific Northwest.
For a discussion of the effects of listing the salmon, see Scott W. Reed, Fish Gotta Swim: Establishing
Legal Rights to Instream Flows Through the Endangered Species Act and the Public Trust Doctrine,
28 IDAHO L. REv. 645 (1992); Andrew S. Noonan, Note, Just Water Over the Dam? A Look at the
Endangered Species Act and the Impact of Hydroelectric Facilities on Anadromous Fish Runs of the
Northwest, 28 IDAHo L. Rnv. 781 (1992).
10. See, e.g., T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (upholding an injunction against the completion
of a federal dam project, for which Congress had already spent $78 million, in order to protect the
endangered snail darter). See also Young, supra note 4 (discussing the economic impact of the ESA's
protection of coastal sage scrub, chinook salmon, delta smelt, Colorado squawfish, and the spotted owl).
11. Young, supra note 4.
12. See Economic Issues to Be 'Prevailing Factor' in Battle Over Reauthorization, Hatfield Says,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2080, 2080 (Dec. 18, 1992). The article discusses why the Oregon senator
believes that the ESA can work as drafted and applied. However, while Senator Hatfield supports
reauthorization of the ESA, he strongly believes that economics will be "'a prevailing factor[.]"' Id.
Nonetheless, other senators believe that Congress should "amend the guts out of the... Act." Id.
[VOL. 71:1217
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This Note uses the Lucas decision as a framework for examining the
legal relationship between the ESA and prior appropriations water rights.
Previous discussions of federal regulation of state-derived property rights
have failed to address the relationship between the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and applications of the ESA."3 Part I discusses the
regulatory protective and prohibitive mechanisms of the ESA. Part II
analyzes prior appropriations water rights and the manner in which the
federal government regulates water rights under the ESA. Part III examines
the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence and discusses the
Court's recent decision in Lucas. Part IV uses a hypothetical fact pattern
to demonstrate how application of the ESA to a prior appropriator could
result in a taking under the Lucas framework.
I. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The ESA regulates the protection of any species of fish, wildlife, or
plant, that is threatened or in danger of becoming extinct. 4 In 1973,
Congress passed the ESA in order to preserve, maintain, and rehabilitate
the tenuous ecosystems of endangered or threatened species." In passing
the ESA, Congress determined that many plant and animal species were on
the verge of extinction because of previously uninhibited commercial
development.' 6 The Act explicitly states that the federal government shall
13. See Tarlock, supra note 3.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988). Under the ESA, "endangered species" means:
[A]ny species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest
whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and
overriding risk to man.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988).
15. Under the ESA, a species threatened with possible extinction is defined as "any species which
is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1988). 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) dictates:
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program
for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps
as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in
subsection (a) of this section.
Id.
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(aXl)-(2) states:
The Congress finds and declares:
(1) Various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered
extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in numbers that they
are in danger of or threatened with extinction.
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preserve all threatened or endangered species, by conserving the habitats
necessary for their survival.17 In particular, the ESA pledges cooperation
with the states regarding any conflict between conservation efforts and state
water rights.
s
The ESA has three primary devices that act in concert to protect
threatened or endangered species: (A) listing and determination of critical
habitats; (B) agency consultation and protection requirements; and (C) the
prohibition against "taking," in other words, hunting, trapping, or otherwise
harming,19 any threatened or endangered species.20  The ESA requires
the appropriate government agency to promulgate property use regulations
implementing each of these protective mechanisms.2 Congress has the
authority to regulate endangered species under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.'
A. Listing a Species and Determining Its Critical Habitat
Section 1533 provides the mechanism for determining if a species is
endangered or threatened.' Any interested person or group may petition
the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to have a species "listed"24 as
endangered or threatened.' Once a petition is submitted, the Secretary
must follow the ESA's guidelines in deciding whether or not to list the
species." The decision to list the species depends on one or more of the
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (1988). Congress extended this policy to the federal government in
its international programs and its numerous international treaty obligations. 16 U.S.C. §1531(a)(4)-(5)
(1988). See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (declining to confer standing upon
private citizen's group because it was removed from the international arena in which alleged ESA
violations occurred).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(c)(2) (1988) ("It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal
agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in concert with
conservation of endangered species.").
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988). See also infra text accompanying note 52.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988); Tarlock, supra note 3, at 6.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988). This section grants the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of
Commerce the power to promulgate regulations. In some instances, the Secretary of Agriculture may
create regulations.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 states, "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (1988).
24. "Listed" is an ESA term of art. Cf. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 6.
25. Endangered Species Committee Regulations, Listing Endangered and Threatened Species and
Designating Critical Habitat, 50 C.F.R. §§ 424.14, 424.10 (1990).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988).
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following factors: present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of the species' habitat or range; over-utilization of the species'
habitat for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
disease or predation of the species; inadequacy of existing regulatory
mechanisms to preserve the habitat; or other natural or man-made factors
affecting the species' continued existence.27 The existence of any of these
factors is determined on the "basis of the best scientific and commercial
data available. 28  This initial decision to list a species does not take
economic considerations into account.29
Once a species is listed, the Secretary must then designate the species'
critical habitat.3" The critical habitat of a species is the specific geograph-
ic area necessary for the species' survival.3" The Secretary must consider
both scientific data and the economic impact of designating a habitat.
32
After the Secretary has listed a species and designated the critical habitat,
the Secretary may issue any regulations deemed "necessary and advisable
to provide for the conservation of such species."33 In addition to these
protective regulations, the Secretary must also develop a recovery plan,
detailing the procedures to be followed in conserving the species.34
Moreover, the Secretary must monitor the species' status3" and promulgate
guidelines each federal agency must follow in order to fully comply with
the Act's provisions.36
B. The Agency Consultation and Protection Requirement
The agency consultation requirement, set out in 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7),
addresses federal regulation of federal agencies under the ESA.37 Under
section 1536(7), every federal agency or license applicant must insure that
any action that it funds, authorizes, or carries out will not jeopardize
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (1988).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(bXl)(A) (1988).
29. H.R. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 159 (1978), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557,
2576.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533 (aX3)(A)-(B) (1988).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5XA) (1988).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(bX2) (1988).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (1988). The Secretary must create a recovery plan to promote the
survival of the species, unless such a plan will not achieve that end. Id.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(g) (1988).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h) (1988).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
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protected species.38 Prior to taking action, every federal agency or license
applicant must consult with the Secretary39 to determine if the proposed
action will affect a protected species' designated critical habitat. 0 If the
Secretary determines that the proposed agency action will affect a protected
species, then the ESA requires the agency to prepare a "biological
assessment.' Based upon the assessment, if the Secretary ultimately
determines that the agency action will harm the protected species, the
Secretary will "suggest reasonable and prudent alternatives which he
believes would not violate" the ESA's protection scheme.42
The Supreme Court addressed the ESA's agency consultation require-
ment in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.43 In Hill, the Court concluded
that Congress intended the ESA to prohibit "taking" any protected species,
even if the prohibition harmed ongoing federal projects.' After Congress
appropriated funds for the Tellico Dam, the respondents in Hill sought to
enjoin the dam's construction under section 1536(7) of the ESA. The
respondents argued that the dam would destroy the critical habitat of the
endangered snail darter, a small fish."
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, focused on the legislative
history of the ESA and section 1536(7).46 The Chief Justice reasoned that
Congress placed greater priority in saving endangered species than in
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
39. See Endangered Species Committee Regulations, Interagency Cooperation, 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.01(b) (1992) (reassigning authority to administer the Act from the Secretary of Interior to the Fish
and Wildlife Service).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1988).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1988).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (b)(3)(A).
43. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
44. Id. at 186. The district court had denied the respondents' request for an injunction. The court
reasoned that despite the jeopardizing effects that the dam could have had on the snail darter, "[at some
point in time a federal project becomes so near completion and so incapable of modification that a court
of equity should not apply a statute enacted long after inception of the project to produce an
unreasonable result" 419 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court opinion. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
The court found that completion of the dam was a prima facie violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1536(7). Id.
at 1072.
45. Hill, 437 U.S. at 161. The respondents, a group of biological scientists, a conservation group,
and citizens who used the Little Tennessee Valley, which was to be affected by the dam, had petitioned
the Secretary of the Interior to list the snail darter as an endangered species in 1975. Id. As a result,
the Secretary listed the snail darter on October 8 of that year. Id. Furthermore, the Secretary
determined that 100% of the critical habitat was within the geographic region affected by the Tellico
Dam. Id.
46. Id. at 183-87.
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continuing federal agency missions.47 Although the ESA took priority
over existing and future federal programs, the majority concluded that
section 1536(7) could also require agencies to alter ongoing projects in
order to satisfy the ESA's requirements. 5 Thus, the Court affirmed the
powerful protective provisions of the ESA despite the incredible economic
costs associated with compliance.49  Furthermore, the Court relied heavily
on Congress' conclusion that habitat modification is the greatest threat to
protected species."
C. The Prohibition Against "Taking"
The ESA, in section 1536(9), stipulates that it is unlawful to "take" an
endangered species."' According to the ESA, to "take" a species is "to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt
to engage in such conduct."52  This prohibition applies to any federal
agency or private individual.53 A "taking" also occurs when a state,
agency, or individual adversely alters an endangered species' habitat.54
47. Id. at 185-86. The Court opined that Congress was clearly concerned about "the potentially
enormous danger presented by the eradication of any endangered species." Id. at 186.
48. Id. at 186. The Court stated, "[lit is clear Congress foresaw that § 7 would, on occasion,
require agencies to alter ongoing projects in order to fulfill the goals of the Act." Id. The Court also
held that the ESA still applied, despite the fact that Congress had appropriated funds for the dam after
it knew of the section 1536(7) implications. Id. at 189. "There is nothing in the appropriations
measures, as passed, which states that the Tellico Project was to be completed irrespective of the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act." Id.
49. Id. at 187. The Court stated that despite the loss ofmillions of dollars the public would suffer,
the ESA clearly showed that the value of an endangered species was "incalculable." Id. By the time
the case reached the district court, Congress had already appropriated $78 million to the dam project.
Id. at 166.
50. Id. at 179-81.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988). For a comprehensive study of 16 U.S.C. § 1536(9) of the
ESA, see Federico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against Takings in Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 109 (1991).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988).
54. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants Provision, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991). An act
that "harms" a species is "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife." These acts include
"significant habitat modification or degradation [that] actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." Id.
Professor Tarlock discussed the relationship between the "takings" provisions and 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(7):
Theoretically, each time an endangered species is killed by a project, a section 9 violation
occurs. The section 9 prohibition against "takings" has been characterized as double jeopardy
because an activity, such as a water diversion project, could be in violation of the Act even
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Resources,55 the district
court concluded that a state cannot avoid application of the ESA by
maintaining that it holds its wildlife in a public trust. 6 In Palila, the
Hawaii Department of Land and Resources maintained a feral sheep and
goat game reserve in an area that included the critical habitat of the
endangered Palila bird. 7 The court dismissed a Tenth Amendment claim
that the state had sovereignty over its species, holding that the Commerce
Clause granted Congress the power to supersede state control of wildlife."
Focusing on section 1536(9) of the ESA, the court held that the game
reserve had a negative impact on the Palila bird and its critical habitat.59
The court concluded that the ESA's prohibition against "taking" included
a taking through alteration of the species' critical habitat.6
Recently, in Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon
v. Lujan,6 1 the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the
Secretary's interpretation expanding the definition of "take" under section
1536(a) of the ESA. 62 Pursuant to the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior
broadened the definition of the term to include instances of "significant
though it received section 7 clearance.
Tarlock, supra note 3, at 9.
55. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979). The Sierra Club and other conservation groups brought
this action in the name of the Palila bird. Id. at 987. For a thorough discussion of Palla and its effect
on actions under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(9), see Cheever, supra note 51, at 143-50.
56. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995. The Department of Land and Resources alleged that applying the
ESA to protect the Palila violated Hawaii's Tenth Amendment right to sovereignty over its own
wildlife. Id. The court discounted this argument under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 995.
57. Id. at 989. The defendants had maintained the reserve since 1950. Id.
58. Id. at 995. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In dictum, the district court referred to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), which held that the states yielded control of
their wildlife to the federal government's power to regulate wildlife in the name of commerce. 471 F.
Supp. at 992. The district court also noted that through certain international treaties, the federal
government has recognized that species preservation is of national interest. Id. at 993.
59. Id. at 990. The court concluded that "Congress has determined that protection of any
endangered species anywhere is of the utmost importance to mankind, and that the major cause of
extinction is the destruction of natural habitat." Id. at 994-95.
60. Id. at 991, 999.
61. 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), affd sub nom. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 283. The plaintiffs were citizens' groups, individuals, and businesses, all of whom
depend upon the timber industry in the Northwest and Southeast United States. Id. at 281. The
plaintiffs brought suit alleging that because the Secretary had listed the Northern Spotted Owl and other
species as protected, the plaintiffs had to curtail the use of their property, resulting in economic losses.
Id. at 282.
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habitat modification or degradation" that injure or kill a protected
species.6' The court relied on the legislative history of the ESA and
concluded that Congress intended to define "take" broadly.' By
extending the regulation of property to include prevention of habitat
modification, the Court strengthened the "takings" prohibition of the ESA.
II. WESTERN STATES' PRIOR APPROPRIATION WATER RIGHTS
Water rights, like most property rights, are derived from the states and
not the federal government.' Most Eastern states follow the doctrine of
"reasonable use,"' whereby a riparian owner, one who owns property
adjacent to a water source,' may use the water in any reasonable manner,
provided the owner does not unreasonably interfere with another riparian
owner's reasonable use. 68  However, because of the divergent climatic
conditions and the widely dispersed sources of water in the western United
States, the common-law reasonable use doctrine did not equitably maximize
the use of water.69  Applying the "reasonable use" theory in these areas
63. Id. at 281-82. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19), the Secretary of the Interior promulgated a
regulation defining the word "harm" in the ESA's definition of "take." Id. The regulation defined
"harm" as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991).
64. 806 F. Supp. at 283. Both the House and Senate reports show an intent to interpret the term
"take" broadly. "'Take' is defined in Section 3(12) in the broadest possible manner to include every
conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." S. REP. No.
307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). The House noted that the definition of takings "includes, in the
broadest possible terms, restrictions on the taking, importation and exportation, and transportation of
[endangered] species." H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 15 (1973). The case was affirmed
on appeal. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, I F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1993). The majority agreed with the district court's reasoning regarding the definition of"harm" under
the "take" provision. 1 F.3d at 8. However, the dissent would have struck down the regulation under
the statutory construction principle of noscitur a sociis. Id. at 11 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that "a general word in a list should be interpreted narrowly" in order to avoid exceeding the
intended scope of congressional acts. Id. Thus, because the definition of "take" under the statute
included to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect," 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19) (1988), construing harm to mean "habitat modification" as the regulation defines it would
be to give a broader meaning to the term then Congress intended. Id. at 11-12.
65. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.4, at 422 (1988) (stating that
riparian rights are born out of the common law). For a comprehensive treatise on water rights theories,
see A. DAN TARLOcK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsoURcES 10-23 (1991).
66. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 65, § 7.4, at 422.
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327 (6th ed. 1990).
68. See CuNNINGHAM, supra note 65, § 7.4, at 423.
69. WELLS ALECK HuTcHiNs, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST
64-65 (1942).
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would have resulted in granting a priority to riparian land owners over non-
riparian land owners, regardless of who had greater need or capacity.7"
Therefore, the Western states developed the theory of prior appropriation
water rights.
The goal of the prior appropriation theory is to distribute water supplies
so that they can be most "beneficially and economically utilized. 71
Because the prior appropriation theory seeks to maximize beneficial use of
water, the theory is grounded on the notion of "first in time, first in right,"
establishing principal appropriation rights in the individual who first
acquires the water right.72 The right to appropriate originates, administra-
tively, with the state, because the state owns non-navigable waters in trust
for the public and regulates all acquisitions of appropriations rights.73
Thus, the state provides the procedure under which an individual can apply
for, and perfect, a right to appropriate water from a non-navigable water
source.
74
The prior appropriator's right to appropriate is secure and without
70. Id. Furthermore, diversions of water for use on non-riparian lands would encroach upon the
riparian landowner's use of water, due to the lack of consistency of the water source. Id.
71. For a thorough discussion of Western states' water rights theory, see generally WILLIAM
GOLDFARB, WATER LAW (2d ed. 1988); WELLS ALECK HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE
NINE EEN WESTERN STATES (1972). Each of the 17 western states practices either a pure prior
appropriations theory, known as the "Colorado doctrine," or a dual reasonable use and prior
appropriations theory of state water rights, called the "California doctrine." CUNNINGHAM, supra note
65, § 7.4, at 423-25,427. The ard states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming follow the "Colorado doctrine." CUNNINGHAM, supra note 65, § 7.4, at 427. The
less ard states of California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
and Washington follow the "California doctrine." CUMINGHAM, supra note 65, § 7.4, at 427. In the
western states, water sources are more often snow and rain rather than lakes, rivers, or other ostensibly
constant sources of water. HUTCHINS, supra note 69, at 65. "The sources of water are snow and rain
on the mountain ranges and other higher lands, which in seeking lower levels flows over and under the
surface in streams and in diffused flows." Id.
72. See ARiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1512-167 (1988); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1414-1422 (West
1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-102 (1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-101-252 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 821-701-732 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-301-328 (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 46-202-206
(1990); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 533.010-533.545 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-6-31 (Michie 1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.23-105.31 (1990); ORE. REv. STAT. § 537 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 46-5-1-52 (1982); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.023-11.336 (West 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 73-3-1-23 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.16 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 41-3 (1972).
73. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 14; HUTCHINS, supra note 69, at 74. The states began to enact
legislation codifying the law of prior appropriations during the mid-1800s. Id. at 74-75. Moreover, the
states have, for the most part, dedicated all unappropriated waters for the public's use. Id. at 78-80.
74. HUTCHINS, supra note 69, at 74. The federal government holds the power to determine
whether non-navigable waters in the public domain may be appropriated. Id.
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limitation, so long as the appropriator uses the water for a beneficial use.7'
The prior appropriator may not appropriate water for speculative purposes
or appropriate more water than the appropriator can use, as neither of these
appropriations would be "beneficial" uses of the water.76 However, the
appropriator may seek to increase the amount that can be appropriated if
the need for more water for a beneficial use also increases or is devel-
oped.77
The amount of the appropriation is stipulated in the appropriator's title,
and the state will permit the appropriator to take only that amount of water,
save the above circumstance. 7' A secondary appropriator may also obtain
the right to appropriate water from the same source as the prior appropria-
tor, subject to the same prerequisites as the prior appropriator.79 However,
the secondary appropriator's right to appropriate is a right to take only the
excess of the prior appropriator's appropriation for beneficial uses."° This
applies to all subsequent appropriators.
The prior appropriations right is not a right in the water itself, but in the
water's use. As a result, any restriction of the prior appropriator's .right to
withdraw water is an infringement of that property right.8" States that
employ the appropriations theory recognize that a subsequent appropriator
may modify the prior appropriator's right to use water.8 2 Therefore, in all
75. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 14. Beneficial uses include irrigation, domestic use, and other
farming or mining needs. HUrCHINS, supra note 69, at 65-68.
76. HUTCHINS, supra note 69, at 65-66 (quoting Union Mill & Mining Co. v. Daugberg, 81 F. 73
(C.C.D. Nev. 1897)).
77. Id. at 65 ("'ITihe appropriator is entitled, not only to his needs and necessities at that time,
but to such other and further amount of water ... as would be required for the future improvement and
extended cultivation of his lands.").
78. HUTCHINS, supra note 69, at 65-66.
79. Id.
80. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 65, § 7.4, at 424. The authors state:
The basic apportionment principle is that one, not necessarily a riparian owner, who makes
a prior use of water for some 'beneficial' purpose may gain the right to continue doing so.
Under most systems the prior appropriator's right is subject to being diminished by a later
claimant who can establish a need for water for a preferred beneficial purpose. However,
since water rights are viewed as property rights, the diminished prior appropriator must be
compensated.
Id.
81. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 257-59 (1991) (stating that the nature of the prior appropriations right is such that restricting
the amount of water that can be appropriated infringes on the very nature of the property right).
82. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 92 (1977).
Appropriations states have compensated owners in this situation unless the subsequent appropriator's
specific use is preferred to the prior appropriator's use. Id. For example, a domestic use of water is
preferred to an agricultural or purely economic use. Id. Appropriations states accordingly require the
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instances of appropriation, when the prior user is restricted from withdraw-
ing the amount of water allotted in the appropriations permit, the secondary
appropriator must compensate the prior user for infringing on the prior
appropriations right.83
A. Federal Regulatory Doctrines: Modifications of States' Prior
Appropriations Schemes
The federal government's authority to regulate appropriations water
rights is drawn from Congress' power to regulate commerce under the
Commerce Clause.84  Courts have recognized several different theories
under which the federal government may regulate state appropriations water
rights in the name of protecting commerce.
1. Federal-Reserved Water Rights
Courts have recognized a theory of federal-reserved water rights on
federal lands." These rights are a hybrid of appropriations and riparian
rights because they allow federal appropriation of water, but require the
water to be on federally-owned riparian land.86 Unlike the holder of a
subsequent user to compensate the prior appropriator for the value of the lost water. Id.
83. Id.
84. The states' authority to regulate state water rights rests in the public trust doctrine. The public
trust doctrine theorizes that the state holds in trust for the public all lands not owned privately. Estes,
supra note 5, at 1029-30. The Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine in Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), in which the Court held that the state of Illinois could not sell land
beneath the Chicago harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad Company. 146 U.S. at 453. The Court
determined that the lands beneath navigable waters are for the public and that the state cannot relinquish
its responsibility over these lands. 147 U.S. at 453.
In National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983), the California Supreme Court firmly applied Illinois Central to a state's power to appropriate
water through the public trust doctrine. The dispute arose because Mono Lake was being appropriated
via a man-made aqueduct by users in Los Angeles. The California Supreme Court held that the state
must consider the public trust interest when appropriating water rights. Id. at 728, 732.
85. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 14-15. The Supreme Court first recognized federally reserved water
rights in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In Winters, the Court applied these rights in
the context of federal Indian reservations. 207 U.S. at 567. The Court held that "[lthe power of the
Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not
denied, and could not be." Id. at 577.
86. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 14-15.
Theoretically, federal-reserved proprietary water rights are mules. They have hybrid
appropriative and riparian characteristics. They have a priority date and entitle the holder to
a fixed quantity of water like appropriative rights. But they also have riparian characteristics;
i.e., the right depends on federal land ownership rather than on the application of water to a
beneficial use.
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state prior appropriations right, the holder of a federal-reserved right may
only appropriate the minimum amount of water necessary to support the
federal appropriator's purpose.8 7 Furthermore, Congress creates these
water rights through legislation that specifically sets such land aside, rather
than the "first in time" theory of prior appropriations.88 Therefore, the
federal-reserved water right permits federal appropriation of water without
compensating any private property owners who might be affected by the
action, only when the federal government has held title to the water right
prior to the date of the private owner's title. 9 However, Congress and the
courts disfavor setting aside federal-reserved water rights because the action
treads on a traditionally state-derived right." Therefore, the use of the
federal-reserved right is limited. As a result, Congress often resorts to
regulating land or navigable water to avoid having to actually claim land
to ascertain the federal-reserved water rights.91
In United States v. New Mexico,92 the Supreme Court stated that it
disapproved of finding congressional claims of implied federal-reserved
water rights. In this case, the United States government claimed that when
Congress set aside the Gila National Forest from other public lands, it
reserved the right to use the water of the Rio Mimbres River for all
purposes commensurate with the withdrawal of the land.93 The Court held
that unless Congress explicitly states its intention to reserve water rights for
specified federal uses, a federal-reserved right does not exist.94 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the Government's claim was
inconsistent with the relatively narrow purposes for which national forests
87. Id. at 15.
88. Id.
89. See United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 143-46 (1976).
90. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 15. The Supreme Court articulated its disfavor of finding
congressional claims in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978), stating: "Mhe
'reserved rights doctrine' is a doctrine built on implication and is an exception to Congress' explicit
deference to state water law in other areas." Id.
91. Tarlock, supra note 3, at 15. In Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), the Supreme
Court implied that it preferred federal regulation by refusing to find federal-reserved water rights.
92. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
93. Id. at 704-05. The United States asserted that Congress had intended to reserve the water of
the Rio Mimbres for "aesthetic, recreational and fish-preservation purposes." Id. at 705. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico disagreed with the Government's contention, holding that in setting aside a
national forest, the government only reserved the amount of water necessary "to insure favorable
conditions of water flow and to furnish a continuous supply of timber." Id. at 704 (quoting Mimbres
Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615, 617-19 (N.M. 1977).
94. Id. at 709. The Court stated that when Congress intended to reserve water flows for specific
purposes, it expressed those purposes in the language of the reservation. Id. at 710.
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have been reserved." The Court concluded that Congress intended to
regulate the Rio Mimbres only to preserve the timber and maintain
favorable water flows for public and private uses.96
2. Navigational Servitude and Federal Supremacy
The federal government has also utilized the theory of navigational
servitude to regulate state-allocated water rights.97 The navigational
servitude theory holds that the federal government, under the Commerce
Clause, has the right to maintain and create navigable waters.9" Under
this theory, all navigable water rights, which are primarily state-created, are
held subject to a federal "servitude" to regulate and improve navigation.99
Therefore, imposing a navigational servitude on a state water rights user is
not a compensable regulation because the user has always been subject to
the federal servitude.
The Supreme Court upheld the federal government's power under the
navigational servitude doctrine in United States v. Willow River Power
Co."° The Court held that the federal government was not required to
compensate a power company for interfering with the company's state-
allocated water rights when the government acted to improve the navigabil-
ity of an interstate waterway."' Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
95. Id. at 707-08. Justice Rehnquist noted that national forests were to be reserved for the two
limited purposes of protecting forests from human destruction and preserving the water conditions and
flow necessary to conserve the forest's conditions. Id. at 708. Justice Rehnquist further noted that the
government's aesthetic and recreational uses would defeat the original intent of preserving the water's
quantity and quality. Id. at 713.
96. Id. at 718. The Court concluded that Congress created the national forest system to preserve
the forest through water regulation. Id. Furthermore, Congress continually deferred to state water law,
rather than exercising its federal reservation power to achieve this end. Id.
97. See Estes, supra note 5, at 1038.
98. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 65, § 7.4, at 425. The authors describe the navigational servitude
doctrine:
On navigable water a major limitation on the riparian owner's rights is imposed by what is
commonly called the "navigation servitudes" held by the Federal Government and to a much
lesser extent by state governments. Under an extension of the commerce clause of the United




100. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
101. Id. at 511. The claimants owned a power producing dam on the Willow River, which empties
into the St. Croix River. Under a federal project to improve navigability on the Upper Mississippi and
St. Croix Rivers, the federal government constructed a dam on the Mississippi that caused the
headwaters of the Willow River to flood the claimant's dam. Id. at 499-502. The claimants argued that
their property right to use of the Willow River headwaters had been taken, requiring just compensation.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss4/18
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first declared that only the taking of legally protected property rights
requires compensation."° The Court then stipulated that legally protected
property rights must be weighed against the federal government's right to
improve navigability." 3 The Court concluded that federal operations
designed to improve navigation do not require compensation unless
property is actually taken."°
3. Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the power through which a sovereign may take
private property for public use. 5 This power is an attribute of sover-
eignty, inherent in all independent states."° The federal government's
eminent domain power is limited by the Fifth Amendment, which requires
that when the government takes private property for public use, it must pay
the property holder just compensation.'0 7 A governmental taking may be
either trespassory or nontrespassory.'0 5 A trespassory taking occurs when
Id. at 501.
102. Id. at 502. Justice Jackson stated that "only those economic advantages are 'rights' which
have the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may courts compel others to forbear
from interfering with them or to compensate for their invasion." Id. The majority further determined
that the power company had no property interest in the headwater of the Willow River. Id. at 503.
103. Id. at 510. The Court stated:
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the world are certainly rare, and
water rights are not among them. Whatever rights may be as between equals such as riparian
owners, they are not the measure of riparian rights on a navigable stream relative to the
function of the Government in improving navigation.
Id.
104. Id. The Court reasoned that interference with a riparian owner's economic advantage is not
a compensable harm. Id. But c.f. Willow River, 324 U.S. at 515 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("I think it
is a right decision if the United States, under the Constitution, must pay for the destruction of a property
right arising out of the lawful use of waters not regulable by the federal government because they are
not navigable.').
105. JAcQuEs B. GELiN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1982).
106. Id. at 2. Because the eminent domain power inheres in every independent state, it cannot be
abridged. Id.
107. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
State governments may also take property for public use, with payment of just compensation, under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
108. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 65, § 9.1, at 512.
Today it can be pretty generally said that eminent domain law accepts 'property' as an
abstract legal construct. Thus, compensation may be had on account of nontrespassory
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the government physically enters an individual's land and demands title or
a lesser interest in the land.'0 9 Nontrespassory takings usually involve a
taking of a property interest through regulation rather than physical
invasion."'
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,"' the Supreme Court acknowledged
the distinction between the navigational servitude and the eminent domain
takings power of the federal government." 2 In Kaiser Aetna, a privately-
owned, non-navigable marina was subsequently made navigable by the
owners." 3 The federal government wanted to open the marina to public
access, under the theory that because the marina was now navigable, it was
subject to the federal navigational servitude." 4  The private owners
argued that the marina was private property and that granting public access
to it would amount to a taking." 5
The Court noted that both the navigational servitude power and eminent
domain power were derived from the federal government's commerce
power."6  The Court then determined that federal action to maintain
navigability under the navigational servitude doctrine does not include
granting a public right of access over private property."7 The Court
concluded that requiring public access in the case would amount to a taking
interferences by governmental entities that... cause loss of riparian rights; and that seriously
interfere with many other interests normally regarded as property rights.
Id. See also William B. Stoebuck, Condemnation of Riparian Rights, A Species of Taking Without
Touching, 30 LA. L. REv. 394 (1970).
109. STOEHUCK, supra note 82, at 1. In the case of trespassory takings, courts are primarily
concerned with determining the amount of compensation and, at times, with determining whether land
has been condemned for public use. Id.
110. Id. at 171. Nontrespassory takings litigation creates questions whether there has been a
"taking" and if so, whether the government has taken "property." Id. at 1. Nontrespassory takings
usually involve conceptualizing property rights that are distinct from real property. Id. at 2.
111. 444 U.S. 164(1979).
112. Id. at 179-80.
113. Id. at 169. The petitioners conformed the previously non-navigable Kuapa Pond into a
navigable waterway for their private use. Id. at 167. The federal government filed suit claiming that
because the pond was now navigable, it was subject to federal navigational servitude regulation. Id.
at 168-69. The government sought a right of public access to the pond. Id.
114. Id. at 168-69.
115. Id. at 169.
116. Id. at 177. The majority stated that a distinction existed between "taking" riparian lands while
improving navigability, and condemning fast riparian lands-lands not connected to the navigation of
water. Id.
117. Id. at 178. Because the pond was privately owned under Hawaiian law, the majority
recognized that one could own this type of water. Id. at 179. The Court also relied on United States
v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945), which held that the government could not invade
upon a legally supported economic advantage without providing just compensation. 444 U.S. at 178.
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under the Fifth Amendment, requiring just compensation."'
The Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser Aetna illustrates the distinction
between federal action under the navigational servitude doctrine and federal
action under the eminent domain power. Although both powers are derived
from the federal commerce power, their doctrines differ greatly. The
navigational servitude power is premised on the notion that all navigable
waters are "owned" by the federal government, and therefore, all riparian
property-owners' and water rights-holders' of navigable waters property
rights are, and always have been, subject to the higher federal right to
regulate navigability."9 On the other hand, the eminent domain power
is premised on the idea that the federal government may take private
property or a private property right for public use.2 Thus, where the
federal government does not "own" the property or property right and does
not have a right to regulate it that supersedes the private owner's right, the
government must compensate the property owner for the federal regula-
tion-a taking.
B. The Endangered Species Act and State Water Rights
The ESA allows the federal government to regulate the use of water to
conserve protected species.' This right is derived from the federal
power to regulate commerce." Because appropriations water rights are
derived from the state, the question arises whether the federal government
may regulate these state rights through federal regulatory programs such as
the ESA. Courts have determined that appropriations water rights are no
different from any other property right and are thus subject to federal
commerce regulation. u
118. 444 U.S. at 180. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the government could not require public
access "without invoking its eminent domain power and paying just compensation." Id.
119. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
121. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1538 (1988).
122. See supra note 22.
123. Professor Sax has summarized the constitutional issue:
1. Water rights have no greater protection against state regulation than any other property
rights. They are in no sense "super-property."
2. In fact water rights have less protection than most other property rights for several reasons:
... (a) because their exercise may intrude on a public common, they are subject to several
original public prior claims, such as the navigation servitude and the public trust, and to laws
protecting commons; ... (b) their original definition, limited to beneficial and non-wasteful
uses, imposes limits beyond those that constrain most property rights; (c) insofar as water
rights... are granted by permit, they are subject to constraints articulated in the permits.
Sax, supra note 81, at 260.
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In Cappaert v. United States, 124 the Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed a Ninth Circuit decision subjecting a private appropriations water
right to a federal-reserved water right."z The dispute called into question
whether the federal government had reserved an underground pool beneath
the Devil's Hole when it declared the site a national monument in 1952 in
order to protect a threatened species of fish. 26 The dispute arose because
the petitioners argued that the federal government's reservation of the water
should not limit their right to appropriate water from the pool, which
originated in 1968.22
The Court held that because the federal government's purpose in
withdrawing the Devil's Hole from public use was to protect the pool and
its fish, the government had also intended to reserve any unappropriated
water from the pool. 128  The Court further stipulated that the federal-
reserved water right applied to groundwater as well as surface water.12
Because the federal government had reserved water for federal use prior to
the inception of the petitioners' appropriations right, the Court held that the
government was not required to perfect its water right according to state
appropriations law. 3°
The extent of the ESA's reach over existing prior appropriations rights
was addressed by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Carson-Truckee Water
Conservancy District v. Clark.' In Carson-Truckee, the court deter-
mined that the Secretary has an obligation to administer a federal reservoir
in order to protect endangered species. 3 2 The court concluded that until
the species was no longer threatened or endangered, the Secretary's species
conservation duties outweighed the conservancy district's state right to the
124. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
125. Id. at 138.
126. Id. at 131. In 1952, President Truman withdrew Devil's Hole from public use and proclaimed
it a national monument. Id. at 131-32. The President made this proclamation in order to maintain the
underground pool and to protect a unique species of fish, the pupfish, from extinction. Id. at 132.
127. In 1968, the petitioners, owners of land near Devil's Hole, began pumping groundwater that
consistently depleted Devil's Hole. Id. at 133. The petitioners argued that the federal reservation of
Devil's Hole did not enjoin their appropriations right to pump the groundwater. Id. at 135-36.
128. Id. at 139. The Court also recognized that the President had the right to reserve the pool and
protect the pupfish because of their scientific import. Id. at 142.
129. Id. at 142-43.
130. Id. at 143-46. The Court held that federal water rights are not dependent upon state law. Id.
at 145. The Court further held that the determination of reserved water rights derives not from state
law, but from the federal purpose behind the reservation. Id.
131. 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. deniedsub nom. Nevada v. Hodel, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
132. Id. at 262.
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allocated water.'
In both Cappaert and Carson-Truckee, the courts dealt, respectively, with
the federal government's regulation of state water users on federally
reserved land and federal regulation of a federal project.'34 Furthermore,
Kaiser Aetna and Willow River stand for the proposition that the federal
navigational servitude right is restricted to maintaining the navigability of
navigable waters. Thus, federal ESA regulation of a private appropriator
of non-navigable water, the issue that will be addressed in Part IV, must
be considered an exercise of the federal eminent domain power. The issue
inevitably arises whether such federal regulation of a private property right
would constitute a taking.
Having laid out the relationship between federal regulation under the
ESA and the principles of prior appropriations water rights, this Note turns
to a discussion of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, paying
particular attention to the Lucas opinion.
III. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AND LucAs
An analysis of the relationship between the ESA and its regulation of
prior appropriations water rights necessarily leads to the issue of takings.
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Constitution proscribes
the taking of private property without just compensation.33 However,
courts have had difficulty determining what type of governmental action
constitutes a taking. 136
A. History of Takings Jurisprudence
In three early cases the Supreme Court laid down the principles that have
shaped the development of the modem takings doctrine. 13' Each case
involved state, rather than federal, exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
133. Id. at 262. "[Ihe ESA supports the Secretary's decision to give priority to the fish until such
time as they no longer need ESA's protection." Id.
134. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
136. This Note relies primarily on the discussion of takings in Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE
L.J 1077 (1993). For a discussion of general takings jurisprudence, see Jeremy Paul, The Hidden
Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1991); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:
In Search of Underlying Principles, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. (1964).
137. Rubenfeld, supra note 136, at 1083.
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1. Physical Invasions
In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,13 the Supreme Court held that when
a state physically invades private land, the state must compensate the
private landowner.'39 In Pumpelly, the construction of a dam in conjunc-
tion with a state canal project resulted in the irreversible flooding of the
plaintiff's land.14 The Court, rejecting a prior line of cases, concluded
that private lands need not be totally converted for a takings claim to
exist."'41 The Court focused not on the "public use" aspect of the Fifth
Amendment, but rather on the deprivation of the private property's
economic value.142 However, the Court limited its holding to cases
involving some physical invasion of "water, earth, sand or other materi-
al."143
In 1982, the Court further defined the physical invasion takings analysis
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.'" In Loretto, the
Supreme Court concluded that New York legislation requiring the
placement of "thirty feet of one-half inch cable and two, four-square-inch
cable boxes." in rental apartment buildings was a physical taking requiring
just compensation. 145 In striking down the legislation, the Court asserted
that any government action resulting in a permanent invasion'46 would
constitute a taking, regardless of the economic implications. 147  Specifi-
138. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
139. Id. at 180-81.
140. Id. at 167.
141. Id. at 177-78. The Court noted that:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing [the Takings
Clause] ... it shall be held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of
real property to the uses of the public it ... can in effect, subject it to total destruction
without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not
taken for the public use.
Id. at 177-78.
142. Id. at 181.
143. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 181.
144. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
145. Id. at 441.
146. The Court distinguished temporary or non-continuous physical invasions from permanent
physical invasions. Id. at 435 n.12. The Court reasoned that temporary physical invasions "are subject
to a more complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking." Id. For a discussion
of the economic analysis considered in balancing compensation with takings, see Lawrence Blume &
Daniel L. Rubenfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984).
147. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432. The Court stated that "a permanent physical occupation is a
government action of such unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court
might ordinarily examine." Id.
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cally, the Court noted that a permanent physical invasion destroys one of
the property owner's most important rights-the power to exclude others
from the property. 4 Therefore, the Court established a per se takings
rule, applicable when state action results in a physical invasion of private
property' 49
2. Regulation of Harmful Use
In Mugler v. Kansas,15 the Supreme Court recognized the right of the
state to regulate against the harmful or noxious use of private property. In
Mugler, a brewery owner challenged a Kansas statute that proscribed the
manufacture or sale of alcohol. The plaintiff argued that this regulation had
deprived him of the entire benefit of his property, resulting in a compensa-
ble taking.' Despite the economic loss of the plaintiff's factory, the
Court determined that the state's regulation prevented public harm and
therefore required no compensation. 52 The Court concluded that private
property owners have an implied obligation to use their land in a manner
that does not cause injury to the community.153
The Supreme Court again faced the issue of state regulation against
public nuisance in Miller v. Schoene.'54  In Miller, the petitioners were
the owners of land that contained cedar trees. 55 Pursuant to a Virginia
statute providing for the removal of cedar trees infected with cedar rust
disease, the respondent, the state entomologist, ordered the Millers to cut
148. Id. at 435. "The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.. .. [H]e not only cannot exclude others, but [he] can
make no nonpossessory use of the property." Id. at 435-36.
149. Rubenfeld, supra note 136, at 1084-85. See also JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITrrONAL LAW § 11.12, at 436 (4th ed. 1991) ("A permanent physical occupation of private
property by the government or a government regulation which allows someone other than the property
owner to have permanent physical occupation of a definable part of a piece of property should
constitute a taking.').
150. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
151. Id. at 648-49.
152. Id. at 669. The Court stated:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property, as
will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not, and,
consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be, burdened with the
condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to
inflict injury upon the community.
Id.
153. Id. at 665.
154. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
155. Id. at 277.
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down their cedar trees in order to protect Virginia's apple crop."5 6 The
Millers argued that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of their due
process rights.1
7
The Supreme Court rejected the Millers' claim that the statute resulted
in an uncompensated taking of their property.158 The Court held that
because the public interest supported Virginia's decision to save its apple
crop, despite destroying its cedar trees, this action was a valid exercise of
Virginia's police power."9  The Court concluded that because the
infected cedars were akin to a public nuisance, it was not a denial of due
process to enforce their removal without compensation."6°
Both Mugler and Miller stand for the proposition that a state may
regulate private property, without compensating the property owner, if the
property is causing a public nuisance. Furthermore, this regulation is valid
even if the property is being used in a manner that is otherwise legal.
3. Deprivation of Economic Benefit
The Court enunciated a third takings theory in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon. 6' Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes held invalid a
Pennsylvania statute (the Kohler Act) prohibiting coal mining that resulted
in subsidence damage to permanent structures. 162  In Pennsylvania Coal,
the Pennsylvania Coal Company had sold property to the Mahons on the
condition that the company could continue to mine the land beneath the
156. Id.
157. Id. The circuit court found the statute constitutional but awarded the Millers $100 for the
expense of removing the trees. Id. The statute provided no compensation to the landowners for the
value of the trees or the decreased value of the property. Id. The statute merely provided the
landowners with the use of the wood from the felled trees. Id. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision. Id.
158. Id. at 279-81. The Millers challenged the statute's constitutionality under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 277.
159. 276 U.S. at 279-80. The Court focused on the public support for the statute, determining that
it elevated the interest in the apple crop to a public interest, rather than a mere private interest. Id. at
279.
160. Id. at 280. "For where, as here, the choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that... [the statute],
controlled by considerations of social policy which are not unreasonable, involves any denial of due
process." Id.
161. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
162. Id. at 414. "The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the
subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation.... As applied to this
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Mahons' property.1" The Mahons brought suit in Pennsylvania state
court to prevent the coal company from exercising its property rights. The
Mahons argued that the Kohler Act effectively prohibited the coal company
from mining beneath their land.1" The Pennsylvania Coal Company
argued that the Kohler Act was an unconstitutional taking of its property
rights without just compensation.165
The Supreme Court concluded that the Kohler Act was invalid because
it resulted in an uncompensated taking of private property. 66 Justice
Holmes focused his opinion not on the regulation against harm, but rather
on the mining rights owners' deprivation of economic benefit. 67 The
Court laid down the principle that if a regulation "goes too far," it will be
recognized as a taking."
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis69 presented the Court
with essentially the same facts as Pennsylvania Coal.170  In 1966,
Pennsylvania enacted a new Subsidence Act 171 which, similar to the
Kohler Act, prevented the mining of coal where such mining would cause
the subsidence of any surface structure. 72 However, the Subsidence Act,
in the name of public safety, required coal miners to leave fifty percent of
163. Id. at 412. In 1878, the Pennsylvania Coal Company sold the Mahons' surface property. Id.
However, in the deed, the company expressly reserved the right to remove all the coal from beneath
the property sold to the Mahons. Id. Moreover, the deed expressly waived all claims for damages
arising from any coal mining activities. Id.
164. Id. at 412.
165. Id.
166. 260 U.S. at 414. "It is our opinion that the act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police
power, so far as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities in places where the right to mine
such coal has been reserved." Id.
167. Id. at 413. Justice Holmes wrote:
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.
But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process
clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.
Id.
168. Id. at 415. Pennsylvania Coal has come to stand for the principle that "diminution of value
would be a decisive factor in determining the existence of 'taking,' and where the economic impact on
the regulated property was too severe, a taking would likely be found." Rubenfeld, supra note 136, at
1087.
169. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
170. Id. at 473-76.
171. Id. at 474.
172. Id. at 474-75. The Subsidence Act prohibited mining that causes subsidence damage to public
buildings, homes or other dwellings, and cemeteries. Id. at 476.
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the coal in the ground beneath areas subject to possible subsidence.'
The representatives of an association of coal mining operations sued to
enjoin the enforcement of the Subsidence Act. The Association argued that
the Subsidence Act's rule that half of the coal must remain beneath the
surface constituted a taking of its private property without compensa-
tion.174
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that the Subsidence
Act in Keystone could be enforced without compensation, unlike the Kohler
Act in Pennsylvania Coal, because it was promulgated for the public
purpose of promoting health and safety.'75 In addition, focusing on the
diminution of value of the petitioner's property, the Court found that the
petitioner had alleged no injury, but instead made only a facial takings
claim based upon the promulgation of the Subsidence Act.176 Finally, the
Court noted that the Subsidence Act did not constitute a total economic loss
because it applied only to the petitioner's mining rights to sell its coal.' 7
The Court held that the Association still retained the remaining elements
of property rights, such as ownership of the coal, and that this "bundle of
property rights" is the relevant "property" by which to consider economic
devaluation.'
173. Id. at 476-77. "Since 1966 the [Department of Environmental Resources] has applied a
formula that generally requires 50% of the coal beneath structures protected by § 4 to be kept in place
as a means of providing surface support." Id.
174. Id. at 478-79. The district court and court of appeals both rejected the Association's claims.
Id. at 479-81.
175. Id. at 485-92. The Court noted that Pennsylvania had specifically enacted the Kohler Act for
the benefit of private economic interests. Id. at 487-88. Thus, the Court focused on the nature of the
state action and the state's purpose in assessing whether the state passed the act for the public interest.
Id. at 492.
176. Id. at 493. The Court noted that facial takings challenges are extremely tenuous because the
Court cannot invoke its balancing test to compare the remaining value of the property with the value
of the destroyed interest. Id. at 497.
177. Id. at 500-02. Under Pennsylvania law, the mineral estate, surface estate, and support estate
are all considered distinct, conveyable estates. Id. at 500. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument
that the Subsidence Act entirely destroyed its interest in the mineral estate, stating that the right to sell
property is just one part of a property owner's property rights. Id. Moreover, the Court noted that
"[b]ecause petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all of the coal in their mineral estates, the burden
the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking." Id. at 501.
178. Id. at 496-502. The Court focused on the record, which showed that petitioners owned not
only the mineral rights and support estates that could be affected by the Act, but also land that remained
unaffected by the Act. Id. at 501-02. The Court adhered the petitioner's argument that the mineral
estate, support estate, and surface estate are separate types of property and therefore the Act destroyed
its interest in the support estate. Id. at 500. The Court reasoned that because the mineral, support, and
surface estates do not exist independently, and rely on each of the other estates to remain intact, the
state's view that they are separate estates cannot control the reality of their coexistence. Id. at 500-01.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss4/18
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The dissent in Keystone, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, agreed with the
petitioner that the Subsidence Act constituted an uncompensated taking.179
The dissent first determined that Pennsylvania Coal's holding that the
Kohler Act resulted in a taking of property deserved great deference."' 0
Justice Rehnquist then dismissed the majority's view that the Subsidence
Act was similar to a nuisance regulation, noting that its primarily economic
purposes could not exempt it from takings scrutiny."8 ' Finally, turning
to the deprivation of the petitioner's economic benefit in its right to mine
coal, the dissent reasoned that the Subsidence Act extinguished all of the
Association's rights because its mining rights had become essentially
valueless, and thus, non-transferrable.
18 2
As a result of these three lines of takings precedent, the Supreme Court's
takings doctrine was mired in conceptual conflict."8 3 The Court, ac-
knowledging this conflict, began to take an "ad hoc" approach in analyzing
takings cases.1 84 Thus, takings cases lacked a uniformity in analysis and
outcome.
179. 480 U.S. at 520-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 508. Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that the relevant facts of this case were virtually
indistinguishable from those in Pennsylvania Coal. Id. at 508-09.
181. Id. at 512-13.
The central purposes of the Act, though including public safety, reflect a concern for
preservation of buildings, economic development, and maintenance of property values to
sustain the Commonwealth's tax base. We should hesitate to allow a regulation based on
essentially economic concerns to be insulated from the dictates of the Fifth Amendment by
labeling it nuisance regulation.
Id. at 513.
182. Id. at 513-14. The Chief Justice noted first that the Court's precedents have never allowed
a nuisance exception when property has been rendered valueless. Id. at 513. He furthermore stated that
"the Subsidence Act has extinguished any interest one might want to acquire in this property, for 'the
right to coal consists in the right to mine it."' Id. at 514 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414).
183. Rubenfeld, supra note 136, at 1088. Professor Rubenfeld writes:
To put it bluntly, a diminution-of-value test simply cannot be squared with the harm principle
as espoused in the Mugler line of cases. Mugler rested on the idea that owners have no
right--and never had any right---to do harm with their property; hence they are not deprived
of anything when laws enforcing those implied limitations are passed... But if this is so,
then the fact that a harm-preventing measure diminished the value of the regulated
property-no matter to what extent--ought not to convert the regulation into a taking.
Id. at 1087.
184. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Court
wrote that to resolve takings cases, a court must entertain "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Id.
at 124.
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B. The Lucas Case
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'85 the Supreme Court
faced its latest opportunity to articulate a definitive takings doctrine.186
The issue before the Court was whether a South Carolina statute preventing
the construction of permanent habitable structures on certain beachfront
property constituted an "economic deprivation" taking of the petitioner's
land."' David Lucas had purchased his South Carolina beachfront
property in 1986.8 In 1988, the Beachfront Management Act (BMA)
was enacted, prohibiting the construction of habitable structures on certain
coastal areas, including Lucas' property.'89 Lucas sued the Coastal
Council, claiming that the BMA constituted an uncompensated taking of his
property.19
0
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first reiterated the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence, noting that the Court will, without any set
standard, inquire into the facts of takings cases to determine compensability
in all but two classes of regulatory takings. 9 Justice Scalia stated that
in cases of physical invasion of private property and in cases in which a
property owner is deprived of all economic benefit of the property due to
regulation, compensation is always required, without analyzing the public
interest supporting the regulation.1" Government regulation of private
property resulting in total deprivation of economic benefit is always
compensable, the court reasoned, because it is the functional equivalent of
185. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
186. Foradiscussionofthe impact oftheLucas decision, see generally Symposium, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369 (1993); Richard M.
Frank, Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s-The Uncertain Legacy of the Supreme Court's
Lucas and Yee Decisions, 43 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85 (1993); Rubenfeld, supra note 136;
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HAPV. L. REv. 269.
187. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
188. Id. Lucas paid $975,000 for the property with the intention of building single-family homes
on the two lots. Id.
189. Id. The South Carolina Legislature enacted the BMA in an effort to prevent beach erosion and
maintain the condition of certain coastal areas. Id. at 2889-90.
190. The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found a compensable taking and awarded Lucas
$1,232,387.50. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding the BMA a proper regulation
preventing public harm. South Carolina Coastal Council v. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
191. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 ("In 70-odd years of succeeding 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence,
we have generally eschewed any [']set formula['] for determining how far is too far, preferring to
'engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.") Id. (quoting Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York




ESA & WATER RIGHTS UNDER LUCAS
a physical taking. 93
Lucas had argued that his land had been rendered valueless by the
regulation and that therefore, he was entitled to compensation without any
inquiry into the public interest in the regulation.194 However, because the
South Carolina Supreme Court believed the BMA was a proper state
regulation of a nuisance, the Court analyzed the nature of the BMA
regulation. 9 ' In analyzing the Coastal Council's argument that the BMA
was a valid police power exercise that protected the public interest in
preventing harm to the coastal area, Justice Scalia reasoned that such
"harmful or noxious use" analysis has evolved, through Court precedent,
into the premise that land use regulation must advance a legitimate state
interest in order to avoid effecting a taking. 96 As such, Justice Scalia
argued that the BMA could easily be viewed as either a "harm-preventing"
or "benefit-conferring" regulation.'97 Only the latter would require just
compensation.'98 The Court consequently refused to use the Mugler
harmful-use test to determine whether a regulatory taking requires
compensation!" 9
Instead, the Lucas Court articulated a framework for dealing with
regulatory takings issues that encompassed both the nuisance and economic
deprivation analyses of the Court's takings doctrine.2°" Justice Scalia
reasoned that a regulation depriving a property owner of all the property's
economic benefit is the functional equivalent of a "permanent physical
occupation" of property, a situation that always amounts to a taking
requiring compensation.2"' Justice Scalia determined that no property
193. Id. at 2893 ("We think, in short, that these are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief
that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.").
194. Id. at 2896. The trial court had agreed with Lucas that the property was valueless under the
Supreme Court's takings prvedent.
195. Id. at 2896-99.
196. 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
197. Id. Justice Scalia stated that "[tihe transition from our early focus on control of'noxious' uses
to our contemporary understanding of the broad realm within which government may regulate without
compensation was an easy one, since the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring'
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder." Id.
198. Id.
199. Justice Scalia stated that "it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a
touchstone to distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from regulatory
deprivations that do not require compensation." Id. at 2899.
200. Id. at 2900-02.
201. Id. at 2900.
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regulation that renders the property economically inviable can be newly
enacted, without compensation, unless the limitation pre-exists in the
property's title or in "background principles of property and nuisance." 2 2
This framework, the court opined, would only require just compensation for
total regulatory takings that go beyond the limitations imposed upon the
land by background common-law principles. °3
Therefore, the Lucas decision characterizes the Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence as having two categories of analysis. A government
regulation of private property is either a physical invasion or total economic
deprivation taking and is per se compensable, or the regulation is neither
and thus must be analyzed under an ad hoe factual inquiry.
IV. THE EFFECT OF LucAs ON A PRIOR APPROPRIATOR'S TAKINGS
CLAIM
This section will use a hypothetical fact pattern to demonstrate how the
Lucas decision might be applied to a prior appropriator who claims just
compensation based on water use regulations imposed under the ESA. The
Lucas decision provides the proper framework for analyzing a possible
takings action when the federal government regulates a private appropria-
tions water right under the guise of the ESA.2" Consider the following
hypothetical: 2
°5
A is the non-riparian prior appropriator of a non-navigable body of water. A
202. 112 S. Ct. at 2900. The Court stated that regulations prohibiting all economically beneficial
use of property "cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership." Id. Justice Scalia's test opens up the possibility that the same fact
pattern could generate fifty different outcomes depending upon the fifty states' common laws of
nuisance and property. See infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
In DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), the Supreme Court noted that when federal law is
being determined, often state law can establish the aspects of the federal right. Id. at 580 ("The scope
of federal tight is, of course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its content is not to be
determined by state, rather than federal law."). See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
203. 112 S. Ct. at 2901. The Court noted that determining whether there was a total taking of a
property's value would require an analysis of at least "the degree of harm to public lands and resources,
or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's proposed activities." Id.
204. Professor Rubenfeld stated, "If government violates an owner's right to remove objects from
his land, to bequeath it, or to make some money from it (absent a Lucas nuisance exception), it has
impinged upon a fundamental incident of ownership for which compensation must be paid." Rubenfeld,
supra note 136, at 1106.
205. This hypothetical is loosely based on a situation posed by Professor Sax. Sax, supra note 81,
at 272. The basis of the hypothetical is that the water source is critical to endangered species'
existence. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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has held this appropriations right since 1930. A uses the water for the
beneficial purposes of irrigation and basic domestic use. Moreover, A needs
to use all of the water allotted in the appropriations permit in order for A's
farm to make a profit. In 1994, the Secretary lists as endangered a species
of fish living primarily in the body of water from which A appropriates.
Upon listing the fish, the Secretary designates a certain level of instream
water flow as critical to the fish's habitat. The level of water now required
to remain instream includes fifty percent of A's total appropriation allotment.
As a result, the government now regulates A's right to appropriate all of the
water that A is allotted. A sues the government for taking the property right,
seeking just compensation.
Is the diminution of the prior appropriator's property right, in favor of
requiring a certain instream flow level, a taking under the Lucas frame-
work?
A. Proper Analytical Framework
In analyzing whether federal regulation of appropriations water rights
under the ESA is a taking, one must first ask whether appropriations rights
are a transferable property interest.2"s Based upon the Court's opinion in
United States v. Kaiser Aetna, holding that one can privately own the rights
to use a navigable pond,2" and the numerous state statutes creating
property interests in water appropriations, there is little doubt that a prior
appropriations right is a transferable property right."°'
The next question in the takings analysis is whether the property has
been "taken" for public use.' The Lucas Court reasserted two principal
conditions that would result in a taking: (1) a regulation that physically
invaded the private property and (2) a regulation depriving the property
owner of "all economically beneficial or productive use" of the owner's
property.10 When the federal government controls the acts of a prior
appropriations water rights holder under the ESA, this action must first be
analyzed as either a "physical" taking or an "economic deprivation"
206. STOBUCK, supra note 82, at 19. Although there is no definition of "property," courts have
recognized that interests such as riparian rights or easements are considered to be forms of "property."
Id. at 17.
207. 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
208. See supra note 72.
209. STOEBUCK, supra note 82, at 19 ("In most cases this means that a property interest has been
transferred from an owner to an entity having the power of eminent domain.").
210. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
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taking.211
However, when the taking does not fit either of the per se categories, the
case must undergo an ad hoc factual analysis, balancing the social values
and interests in the regulation versus the preservation of the property right.
If the Court determines that the property interest supersedes the public's
interest in the regulation, then and only then, will the government be
required to compensate the property owner.212 Thus, Lucas dictates that
a regulatory takings case must be analyzed to see if it fits either of the per
se categories before the purposes and interests supporting the regulation are
examined.
Is the ESA regulation of A's activities a "physical invasion" regulatory
taking? The Court's most recent cases demonstrate that physical invasions
of property will be treated as per se violations of the Fifth Amendment,
regardless of the size of the invasion.213 In Loretto, the statutory
requirement of placing cable and two four-square-inch cable boxes on the
outside of a building was deemed a physical invasion requiring just
compensation.2 4 Requiring A to maintain a certain instream flow due to
ESA regulation is a regulation of A's narrowly defined property inter-
est.21" However, requiring A to maintain a certain amount of water in the
source is not a "physical" invasion of A's right to appropriate. Under the
Court's "physical" invasion takings analysis, the regulation must actually
require the government or the statutorily-authorized entity to enter upon the
property as an aspect of the regulation.216 In the case of A, the federal
regulation lacks the necessary "physical" invasion upon A's property.
Therefore, the regulation must be analyzed under Lucas' total economic
deprivation test.
B. Total Economic Deprivation
The essence of a property right to appropriate water is the right to divert
a certain quantity of water from a source, without reservation.2 7 Under
211. Seesupra parts III.A.1 & 3.
212. 438 U.S. at 123-28. The Court in Penn Central stated that there is no set formula for
determining compensability, and the facts of the case will be the biggest factor. Id. at 124.
213. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
214. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
215. STOEBuCK, supra note 82, at 90. When an appropriator's right is diminished by a higher
subsequent user, the subsequent user clearly deprives the appropriator of a vested property right and
must therefore compensate the appropriator. Id. at 92.
216. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
217. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
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the Lucas framework, in order for the regulation of A's appropriation right
to be compensable, it must deprive A of the total value of the right to
appropriate.21 Therefore, the ESA's requirement that a certain amount
of water remain in the source must be seen as rendering A's property right
worthless if A is to be compensated.
The right to the total water in one's appropriation permit is obviously the
primary "strand" in the "bundle of property rights" comprising the right to
appropriate water.219 As noted earlier, the purpose behind the appropria-
tions right was to ensure that water would be beneficially used. 2
Moreover, prior appropriation states all believe that private use maximizes
the beneficial use of their state's water."1  A is a non-riparian prior
appropriator, it could be argued that if the ESA were used to prevent A
from withdrawing and using the total amount of water permitted in the
appropriations right, that this alone could deprive A of the total value of the
right. A does not enjoy any other use of the body of water such as the
ability to swim or go boating in the water. A's primary right is in the
water's use for the beneficial purposes of irrigation and domestic use.
However, the right to appropriate and use the water is not A's only
"strand."
Essential to the nature of A's appropriation right is the "right to exclude"
others from encroaching on A s property rights.' The various appropria-
tions statutes all treat a subsequent appropriator's encroachment on the
prior appropriator's right to appropriate as if the subsequent appropriator
had taken the prior appropriator's property, and thus require just compensa-
tion for the amount taken.' Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Loretto
and Kaiser Aetna required that compensation be paid for any encroachment
that denies a property-holder the right to exclude.224 It is therefore clear
218. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 ('The second situation in which we have found categorical [takings]
treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
[property].').
219. Loretto, 480 U.S. at 497 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)) (referring to
property as a "bundle" of rights).
220. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
222. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
223. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
224. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. The Court noted that the "right to exclude" others from even a small
portion of one's property is so fundamental that a regulation that defies this demands compensation
"without regard to the public interests that [the law] may serve." Id. at 426. See also Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 179-80 ("In this case, we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government
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that the right to exclude would be completely abolished if the ESA
operated to require A to maintain a certain level of water that was higher
than the total amount that A is permitted to withdraw under A's right.
The last major strand in A's bundle is the right to transfer the appropria-
tions right-to sell it to another person. It has long been held that the most
important aspect to determing a property's value is the right to sell it. 5
However, because A's appropriation right has been diminished by fifty
percent, the value of the right, in a market for unencumbered total
appropriation rights, is drastically reduced. In order for A's property right
to be of any value, there must be someone who needs only fifty percent of
A's allotted amount of water. Yet, the value to A of the right, compared
with the losses A's farm will suffer, may be completely eliminated.
Therefore, viewing the bundle of rights that comprise A's appropriations
right, A has a strong argument that there is complete deprivation of the
economic benefit of A's appropriation right. To facilitate the remainder of
Justice Scalia's test, this Note assumes, for the time being, that A's property
has been rendered valueless.Y
6
C. Background Principles of Common-Law Nuisance Prohibiting Use
The touchstone issue arising out of the Lucas decision was Justice
Scalia's articulation of the rule that if a state regulation deprives a property
owner of the total value of the property, the state must compensate the
owner unless the regulation's proscriptions inhered in any background
common-law principles of nuisance. 7  Although Justice Scalia did not
believe this rule to be "extraordinary," ' the rule, as articulated, raises
important questions. By resorting to the common-law principle of nuisance
to legitimize regulation that renders a property valueless, Justice Scalia
seemingly articulates a rule that could result in fifty different
outcomes-based on the fifty states' different common-law nuisance
principles. In essence, the second part of Justice Scalia's test is that the
cannot take without compensation.").
225. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
226. For a discussion of how property almost always has value, thus making this aspect of the
Lucas test impractical, see infra notes 247-49.
227. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900. "Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not
part of his title to begin with." Id. at 2901.
228. Id. ("In light of our traditional resort to [existing rules of state law] ... this recognition that
the Takings Clause does not require compensation ... is surely unexceptional.").
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regulation "passes muster only if it restricts some nuisance-like behav-
ior."z 9
In our hypothetical situation involving A, the issue is posed like this: Is
federal regulation of A's appropriation right, under the ESA, a type of
regulation which comports with a common-law nuisance or property
principle that would have also restricted A's appropriation right? This test
raises an interesting federal jurisdiction question. Under Scalia's test, will
federal regulation of a private property owner be treated the same as state
regulation of a private property owner?
In articulating this test, Justice Scalia opines that only those state
regulations that comport with an existing state common-law nuisance
restriction will be allowed, without necessitating the payment of compensa-
tion.no However, the ESA is a federal statute, and the regulation of
private lands would be federal in nature. In order to avoid paying
compensation to A, must the ESA's regulation to save an endangered fish
be an action that could have been brought under the state s common law
of nuisance, or under some federal common-law principle? This question
can be answered by analyzing the factual situation.
Property rights, with few exceptions, are derived from state common and
statutory law. The Supreme Court has taken the position that it will look
to the state to identify cognizable property interests. In Kaiser Aetna, a
case of federal regulation, the court looked to Hawaiian common law to
determine if non-navigable marinas could be privately owned. 1 Thus,
the Court already looks to a state's common law to define the property
rights that may be protected against uncompensated federal takings.
Similarly, the Court looks to state common law when no federal body of
law covering the issue exists. In DeSylva v. Ballentine, 2 2 the Supreme
Court dealt with the Copyright Act and the renewal of copyrights by the
original holder's illegitimate children. 3 In its effort to define whether
illegitimate children were "children" covered by the statute, the Court
229. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1993).
230. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners... under the
State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate
nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Id.
231. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-79.
232. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
233. Id.
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looked to the relevant state law because "there is no federal law of
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern. '
Thus, there is no reason to assume that the Court would refer to any area
of law other than the common law of nuisance in A's state in order to
determine if the ESA regulation is analogous to one of the states common-
law actions.
Having decided that the courts would use state laws to determine the
compensability of the ESA regulation of A, the final question is whether a
common-law nuisance action exists in the prior appropriations states that
would restrict A in order to protect an endangered species of fish. The
simple answer to this question is that no specific common-law nuisance
action to protect endangered species exists in the prior appropriation states.
However, general nuisance principles must first be explored in order to
determine if ESA regulation is equal to a nuisance action.
There are two types of nuisance actions: private nuisance and public
nuisance."35 A private nuisance involves the disturbance of an individual
landowner's use and enjoyment of property. 6 Although private nuisance
actions have been extended to cover property rights holders, like A, 237 the
individual bringing suit is the party who must show ownership of property
and an interference with the use and enjoyment of that property. In our
hypothetical, the government is clearly not to be considered a private
individual with a proprietary interest in the endangered species of fish.
Therefore, the federal government's regulation under the ESA would not
be equivalent to any state common-law private nuisance action against
A.238
The more difficult issue is whether this regulation would be equivalent
to the general public nuisance action that exists at common law. The
nature of the public nuisance is similar to a private nuisance, except that a
public nuisance affects an interest that is shared by the public, not just an
234. Id. at 580.
235. PROSSER & KEETON, ToRTs § 86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).
236. Id. § 87, at 619 ('The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land.").
237. Id. § 87, at 621.
238. Although the federal government has regulatory power over its wildlife, this power creates only
an interest in protecting wildlife, and not a proprietary interest in the wildlife itself. See Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (noting that the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment act to give
the federal government power to regulate wildlife).
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individual. 9  Public interests generally covered under public nuisance
actions include: public health, safety, peace, comfort, and convenience.24
In order to enjoin another's noxious activities in a public nuisance action,
one must be able to show that he or she incurred greater harm than other
members of the public exercising the same right.241 Alternatively, one
may sue as a public official on behalf of a political entity.2 42
In A's case, one must decide whether the federal government's interest
in maintaining species preservation is an interest that was commonly
protected at common law through nuisance actions. It is certainly true that
public nuisance actions have been brought against individuals whose
activities caused harm to the environment.2 43  However, those public
nuisance actions focused on various activities causing pollution.2'
Moreover, no common-law nuisance claims have been brought in the prior
appropriations states in order to preserve endangered or threatened species.
Nonetheless, in Lucas, Justice Scalia noted that when engaging in the
general public nuisance analysis, one must look to "the degree of harm to
public lands and resources" caused by the property owner's use.24 The
analysis must further include assessing the "social value" of a property
owner's activities, as well as the "relative ease with which the alleged harm
can be avoided through measures taken by the [property owner] and the
government."'246 Faced with these assessments, A's activities may well
fit into what, under Justice Scalia's test, would be a public nuisance. A's
actions certainly harm a public resource-an endangered species of fish.
Furthermore, A's appropriations, which could be easily curbed, probably
lack the social value inherent in saving a species. The result of this
analysis is that both parties, the federal government and A, would have
valid points with which to argue their case.
D. Result of the Lucas Analysis to A's Case: Ad Hoc Inquiry
The previous application of the Lucas test demonstrates that the opinion
239. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 235, § 90, at 645 ("To be considered public, the nuisance
must affect an interest common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or
several.").
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1977).
241. Id. § 821C(l), (2Xa).
242. Id. § 821C(2)(b).
243. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 235, § 90, at 645.
244. Id.
245. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (emphasis added).
246. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 827, 828, 830, 831 (1977)).
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is not as significant as expected and is, moreover, troublesome in its
application. The first problem with Lucas is that the total economic
deprivation test employed by the majority will rarely, if ever, be ap-
plied.247 When is a property ever totally without value? From whose
point of view is the value to be determined? In the hypothetical situation,
because A's farm lost money, even if A sold the remainder of the
appropriations rights to a willing buyer A may still come out with a net
loss. The value of the right as sold was less than the value of the right, as
purchased and used, resulting in a net loss. Would A's right be considered
valueless? The answer seems to be that if A could find a buyer for the
fifty percent reduced right, then the property right has a market value.248
Thus, property will almost always be viewed as having some value. As a
result, it has been asserted that most trial courts, after Lucas, will never
apply the total economic deprivation test, opting instead to apply the ad hoc
factual analysis.249
The second problem with the Lucas test, as mentioned, is that many
different tests for background nuisance principles may exist. Under the
previous analysis, it would seem that even if A's property right had no
value because of the ESA regulation, whether A deserves compensation
would depend on the nuisance law in the state in which A lives."' The
combined effect of these criticisms is that Lucas is much less significant
than expected.
Thus, while A has some very good arguments to support the total
economic deprivation takings claim, A will probably fail. Most, if not all,
courts will find that A's appropriation right still retains some value and thus
apply the ad hoc factual analysis." Under this analysis, the Court would
247. Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2908 (Blackmun, . dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that Lucas had
not lost all the value of the property because he could still "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the
property in a movable trailer." Id. Justice Blackmun also noted that property only loses all of its value
in very rare circumstances. Id. Because of this view, Justice Blackmun would not have heard the case,
or analyzed it under the per se compensable talings analysis. Id.
248. The Lucas majority glossed over the discussion of whether Lucas' property had value. As a
result, the Court also glossed over how, and based upon whose interest, the value would be determined.
Nonetheless, value is defined as "[tihe utility of an object in satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs
or desires of human beings .... Also the estimated or appraised worth of any object or property,
calculated in money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, ifa buyer were willing
to pay any money for the remainder of A's allotment right, then the right would have some value.
249. See Richard Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1428
(1993).
250. See supra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
251. Lazarus, supra note 249, at 1428.
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evaluate A's right and balance it with the nature and effect of the
regulation .1 2 Specifically, the economic impact and interference with A's
investment expectations in the water right would be balanced against the
public's interest in protecting endangered species and the extent of the ESA
regulation to A's property right. In the face of this burdensome test, a
court may defer to the government and find no taking at all.253 There-
fore, despite facing a significant economic loss, A may ultimately receive
no compensation for the government's regulatory action under the ESA.
V. CONCLUSION
The ESA, if applied to regulate private property rights, would pose
significant problems regarding the federal government's ability to regulate
private property in its effort to protect endangered species. The prior
appropriations water right serves as a vehicle for demonstrating some of the
possible conflicts between federal regulatory powers and a purely private,
state-derived property right. When this unique situation is examined under
the Lucas regulatory takings analysis, both the ESA regulation and A's
right to appropriate face difficult hurdles.
It is clear that ESA regulation of private property, like any property
regulation, could lead to a takings action. 4 However, Lucas only added
to the confusion surrounding the takings doctrine." Because Lucas does
not place ESA regulation of a prior appropriator, such as A, in either a per
se compensable or uncompensable category, the Courts will be left to
balance the public interest and social value of species preservation versus
those interests in a system of water resource allocation.z 6 Under the
weight of this balance, it seems likely that the ESA regulation could
survive unscathed.257 Such an outcome could threaten the tenuous
stability of a water resource allocation system that has served the Western
states for well over a hundred years. More importantly, the political and
economic ramifications of such an outcome could cause an unfortunate
252. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24.
253. Lazarus, supra note 249, at 1428 ("Faced with the unprincipled vagaries of the multifaceted
balancing test prescribed by Penn Central, the court will most likely apply rational basis scrutiny and
simply sustain the governmental action.').
254. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 186.
256. See supra notes 247-53.
257. Professor Richard Lazarus has stated that "because environmental protection laws almost never
result in total economic deprivations, that categorical presumption will rarely apply .... [C]ourts will
likely apply the opposite presumption that no taking has occurred." Lazarus, supra note 249, at 1427.
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backlash against the ESA and the resolve to preserve endangered and
threatened species. This Note and the hypothetical it poses serves notice
to the courts and Congress that they should ready themselves to face the
new challenges that ESA regulation could pose to private property rights
in the future.
Michael A. Yuffee
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